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“Is Economics in Violation of International Law?” is both the title and the research question of this
very ambitious work by David Lempert. The work boils down to a frontal critique of economics, the
queen of social sciences, both in its mainstream i.e. neoclassical, marginalist economics and in its
anthropologist’s version, i.e. economic anthropology.
The critique however, rather than being carried on in its own terms takes, so to say, the perspective of
a very broad legal question. The author questions economics from the point of view of international law
claiming that the values and principles of international legal coexistence are at odds with those
underpinning economics.
Dr. Lempert also says that because economics is an ideology rather than a science the issue of
whether it is contrary to international law is politically and intellectually relevant. Indeed ideology is part
of the political and institutional construction of the reality.
In the spirit of a vigorous dialogue between scholars sharing a critical agenda I will not devote time to
describe the impressive wealth of erudition and knowledge in economics, law anthropology, humanities
and social science displayed by the author. Readers will be able to realize from themselves that they are in
front of a quite impressive accomplishment. I will rather point out at two fundamental remarks that make
me think critically of the research question in general and some of its assumptions in particular.
The epistemological assumptions of Dr. Lempert’s work exude positivism both in its legal and in its
scientific form. The distinction between science and ideology, to begin with, is assumed as if it existed in
the sky. Is there a science that is not ideology? Most recently, Fritjof Capra and I have approached the
issue in The Ecology of Law. Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community (2015).
Historical reconstruction available since Marx’s discussion of the primitive accumulation show how
ideological has been the scientific method of Descartes, Bacon, Galileo and Newton. “Hard” scientists
now co-exist with humanists, having abandoned the tight separation between subject and object,
especially because the tools of observation clearly determine what is observed. Social scientists find it
hard to accept this early twentieth century epistemological revolution because the conclusion it produces
is nothing less than the political acceptance of the impossibility to distinguish the is from the ought to be.
The distinction between science and ideology, that between the is and the ought to be, and that between
the subject and the object of observation are all legacies of mechanistic thought and scientific positivism
questionable from both a phenomenological and an ecological perspective.
Lempert compares “Economics” his reified object of observation with “International Law” another
reified entity. Is there such a thing as an International law “out there” to be described, ontologically
different from the interpretation and the political praxis of its authors, governments, transnational
corporations, non-governmental organizations or even resisting social movements? How can one say that
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an idealized objectified form (economics) is contrary to another such form (international law) without
considering that both are the product and the outcome of political processes?
The vision of international law that Lempert shows is moreover highly positivistic even in the more
narrow meaning of legal positivism. Even lawyers lacking the impressive interdisciplinary background of
the author feel that international law, among all the areas of the law, is the one most at odds with notions
of legal positivism because of the lack of a centralized authority. In international law not only the subjects
and the object are fused in each-other (which I claim is the case in every aspect of law) but there is no
clear hierarchy of sources of law that can at least make the most narrow legal positivists hide behind a fig
leaf.
Because of what I argued above, the test of international legal compatibility of economics is a
suggestive metaphor to add weight to the political critique of mainstream economics that must be
understood as such, outside of its claim of being based on a better scientific standard (whatever this
means).
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